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CRISIS? WHOSE CRISIS?*
JACK M. BEERMANN**
ABSTRACT
Every moment in human history can be characterized by someone
as “socially and politically charged.” For a large portion of the popu-
lation of the United States, nearly the entire history of the country
has been socially and politically charged, first because they were
enslaved and then because they were subjected to discriminatory
laws and unequal treatment under what became known as “Jim
Crow.” The history of the United States has also been a period of
social and political upheaval for American Indians, the people who
occupied the territory that became the United States before European
settlement.  Although both African-Americans and American Indians
often turned to the federal courts for help, by and large, the Supreme
Court of the United States turned them away, refusing their pleas for
* This Article was prepared for the William and Mary Law Review Symposium: The Role
of Courts in Politically and Socially Charged Moments (Feb. 22-23, 2019). Parts of it are
adapted from a chapter in my book manuscript, Madame Decuir’s Journey to Equal but
Separate.
** Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
Thanks to Kristin Fontaine, Boston University School of Law Class of 2021, for excellent re-
search assistance.
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protection from the sources of their political and social difficulties.
The law, as exemplified in Supreme Court decisions, carried on in
politically and socially charged times as if nothing was the matter.
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INTRODUCTION
Every moment in human history can be characterized by someone
as “socially and politically charged.” Humanity careens from one ex-
istential crisis to the next, but only some crises are acknowledged by
society’s dominant forces. For example, the late 1780s were among
the more politically and socially charged years in the United States.1
Shays’s Rebellion and other events exposed the defects in the
Articles of Confederation that led to the framing of a new constitu-
tion designed to create a stronger and more self-sufficient central
government.2 At the same time, however, for approximately 20
percent of the country’s population, those years were socially and
politically charged for another reason: they were enslaved, treated
by their country and masters as property, and subjected to the most
serious violations of human rights known to man.3 In addition to
forced labor and no freedom of movement, they were subjected to
physical and sexual violence, denial of educational opportunities,
and destruction of their families and other social units.4 And the
voices of these nearly 700,000 Americans were not heard above per-
haps a whisper at the convention that led to the creation of the
United States of America as we now know it.5
The history of the United States has also been a period of social
and political upheaval for another group of people occupying its
territory, the American Indians. Socially, their most serious problem
was initially death due to diseases brought to the continent by
immigrants, which may have killed as many as 90 percent of the
native population in the period after white settlement.6 Those left
alive were conquered by European immigrants who virtually
1. See Jonathan Smith, The Depression of 1785 and Daniel Shay’s Rebellion, 1 WM. &
MARY Q. 77, 84 (1948).
2. Id. at 78-79.
3. See Mary Mederios Kent, Immigration and America’s Black Population, 62 POPULA-
TION BULL. 3, 3 (2007).
4. See Slavery in America, HIST. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/black-
history/slavery#section_11 [https://perma.cc/NJ3J-TZZ7].
5. See, e.g., The Constitution and Slavery, CONST. RTS. FOUND., https://www.crf-usa.org/
black-history-month/the-constitution-and-slavery [https://perma.cc/76GV-8CR7].
6. See The Story of ... Smallpox—and Other Deadly Eurasian Germs, PBS (2005), https://
www.pbs.org/gunsgermssteel/variables/smallpox.html [https://perma.cc/9443-CDSF].
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destroyed their political and social structures.7 The conquerors re-
peatedly violated and disavowed treaties and other promises that
they had made with the vanquished nations.8 Sometimes the gov-
ernment of the United States rescued the American Indians from
dire straits, while, at other times, it put them there and left them to
their collective fate.9
After the end of slavery and the quieting of the direct attack on
the social and political structures of the American Indians, things
were better. But still, the American people were involved in ongoing
crises. For decades after the end of slavery, the federal government
was unwilling to recognize the rights of African Americans or force
the states to respect those rights that had been put down on paper
after the end of the Civil War.10 And the federal government’s treat-
ment of American Indians has continued to be marked by cruelty
and mismanagement.11
This Article is about how the Supreme Court of the United States
reacted to these socially and politically charged periods for African
Americans and American Indians, with the primary focus on the sit-
uation of African Americans during the post-Reconstruction period.
This was a period when African Americans looked to the federal
courts for protection from Jim Crow legislation that threatened to
place them in a situation nearly as unequal and demeaning as
7. See FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE FOUNDERS OF AMERICA 229 (1st ed. 1993). But see, e.g.,
Joseph Heath, An Integral Pillar of the Colonization and Forced Assimilation Policies of the
United States in Violation of Treaties, ONONDAGA NATION (June 7, 2018), https://www.
onondaganation.org/news/2018/the-citizenship-act-of-1924/ [https://perma.cc/C328-B645] (“For
over four centuries the Haudenosaunee have maintained their sovereignty, against the on-
slaught of colonialism and assimilation.”).
8. See Jennings, supra note 7, at 223, 226.
9. See, e.g., Trail of Tears, MUSEUM CHEROKEE INDIAN, https://www.cherokeemuseum.
org/archives/era/trail-of-tears [https://perma.cc/9QFF-7Y8K] (explaining how over 4000 Chero-
kee people perished when they “were forcibly taken from their homes, incarcerated in stock-
ades, forced to walk more than a thousand miles, and removed to Indian Territory”); Christine
Haug, Native American Tribes & U.S. Government, VICTORIANA MAG. (2016), http://victoriana.
com/history/nativeamericans.html [https://perma.cc/MSW8-5GKE] (describing the creation
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Treaty of Fort Laramie in which the federal govern-
ment agreed to respect American Indian tribes’ territorial boundaries and make annual pay-
ments to them).
10. See P. SCOTT CORBETT ET AL., U.S. HISTORY 458 (2014).
11. See, e.g., Andrew Boxer, Native Americans and the Federal Government, HIST. TODAY
(Sept. 2009), https://www.historytoday.com/archive/native-americans-and-federal-government
[https://perma.cc/R2HU-B37Q].
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slavery. As we shall see, by and large, the Court reinforced the
dominant social forces’ determination not to recognize the one long
social and political crisis that constituted the late nineteenth cen-
tury for these millions of Americans.12 Certainly, the Justices were
aware of the world around them, and yet their decisions contributed
to the crises, adding to the misery that millions of Americans were
suffering at the hands of the federal and state governments. While,
of course, the Civil War and everything surrounding it was recog-
nized as a series of political and social crises, the Court appeared
unconcerned with the interests of anyone outside the white, dom-
inant political and social establishment.13 The law, as exemplified
in Supreme Court decisions, failed to react as if it was operating in
politically and socially charged times.14 Mostly, it carried on as if
nothing was the matter.
Perhaps that is the intended message—in politically and socially
charged times, the Court will be a force of stability, helping to quell
challenges to existing power structures, even if it requires ignoring
suffering and injustice. Those rare occasions when the Court steps
in to protect nondominant social groups may occur only when it
appears that even greater instability and damage to dominant
interests would result if it did not. It is, of course, true that during
at least part of the twentieth century the Court assumed a leading
role in championing the rights of African Americans, both in
explicitly racial cases and in other cases in which the human, social,
and political rights of African Americans were threatened.15 This
may be partly due to an accident of history when, for the first time,
the Supreme Court was occupied by a majority of relatively liberal
Justices.16 Even then, American Indians continued to fare poorly in
the Supreme Court, perhaps because nothing that might be done to
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See Dan Keating et al., How Often Does the Supreme Court Overturn Precedents Like
Roe v. Wade?, WASH. POST (May 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/
21/how-often-does-supreme-court-overturn-precedents-like-roe-v-wade/ [https://perma.cc/
LG29-RTV5].
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them would seriously threaten the stability of the country as a
whole.17
I. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN
INDIAN TRIBES
In the limited space available, I could not possibly do justice to
the history of the mistreatment of the American Indians by the
European immigrants to North America, the government of the
United States, and its Supreme Court. There is no question that
European settlement of North America was and continues to be a
great tragedy for the people who were here before them. There are
a few cases that will illustrate the treatment of American Indians
sufficiently without going into great detail.18 The point is that while
these people suffered social upheaval and political crises, the
Supreme Court of the United States was of no value to them and
actually aided and abetted their oppression.19
In 1785 and 1786, the Government of the United States, the
Cherokee Nation, and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations entered
into a series of treaties known as the Hopewell Treaties, named for
the Hopewell Plantation in South Carolina where they were
signed.20 These treaties were later supplemented by the Treaty of
Holston and several additional treaties, with additional agreements
being made as late as 1819.21 These treaties established boundaries
between lands controlled by the United States and lands controlled
by the Cherokee people.22
In 1831, the Cherokee Nation brought a bill in the original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court of the United States, seeking to re-
strain the State of Georgia from enforcing Georgia law in Cherokee
territory and seizing Cherokee land in violation of the treaty
17. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court,
A.B.A. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_
magazine_home/2014_vol_40/vol--40--no--1--tribal-sovereignty/short_history_of_indian_law/
[https://perma.cc/U65V-CG9F].
18. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
20. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause,
85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201, 231 (2007).
21. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 5-6 (1831).
22. Id. at 5.
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obligations of the United States.23 The Constitution grants federal
courts jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies ... between a State ... and
foreign States” and in cases “in which a State shall be Party” the
Constitution places original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.24
Thus, the Court’s jurisdiction over the cases depended on whether
the Cherokee Nation was a foreign state.
To this question, the Supreme Court answered in the negative,
declaring that the American Indian tribes, while possessing a
degree of sovereignty over their lands within the borders of the
United States, are best characterized as “domestic dependent
nations.”25 The Supreme Court thus could not hear this dispute, a
dispute that was vital to the continued existence of the Cherokee
Nation and which turned on the effects of treaties entered into
between the Cherokees and the U.S. government.26 As we shall see,
the key point for present purposes is this: the Court could not hear
the case because the Cherokee Nation was not considered a foreign
state.27 This determination did not necessarily mean that in a
proper case, the Supreme Court would not enforce the treaties that
granted the Cherokee Nation a degree of autonomy over their
lands.28 But it did mean that American Indian tribes would not be
considered foreign nations by the courts of the United States.
Although the Supreme Court enforced the Cherokee Nation’s
power over its reservation in a subsequent case,29 the Court later
analogized the American Indian tribes to foreign nations when
confronted with congressional abrogation of treaty obligations that
resulted in the loss of millions of dollars worth of tribal lands.30 In
1867, the United States entered into The Medicine Lodge Treaty,
23. Id. at 1.
24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
25. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id.
28. One year later, the Court heard a dispute between a citizen of Vermont and the State
of Georgia and determined that Georgia could not require a state license for nonmembers to
live within tribal boundaries. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542, 561-62
(1832). The Court observed that “[t]he Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupy-
ing its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter.” Id. at 561.
29. Id.
30. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 555-67 (1903).
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recognizing control over certain lands by the Kiowa and Comanche
Tribes and creating a reservation for their benefit.31 Later, the
Apache tribe also became a signatory to the treaty.32 Article twelve
of that treaty provided that no subsequent treaty could provide for
the alienation of reservation land without the signatures of three-
quarters of the adult male American Indians residing on the land.33
In 1892, a new treaty was entered into which gave up the reserva-
tion, provided for the allotment of title to some reservation land to
individual American Indians, and paid the tribes two million
dollars.34 Although at the time the new treaty was entered into, the
signatories agreed that more than the required three-quarters of the
adult male inhabitants had signed, the Kiowa, Comanche, and
Apache Tribes soon claimed that the three-fourths requirement had
not been met and that the new treaty had been procured by fraud.35
On June 6, 1900, supplemented by further statutes enacted in
1901, Congress enacted a bill purporting to ratify the provisions of
the 1892 treaty.36 Lone Wolf, a member of the Kiowa Tribe, brought
a suit in equity in the courts of the District of Columbia purporting
to represent all members of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
American Indians, seeking to invalidate the 1892 treaty.37 Shortly
after the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia denied Lone
Wolf ’s application for a preliminary injunction, the President of the
United States issued a proclamation opening up the ceded reserva-
tion lands to settlement by non-Indians.38
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Lone Wolf claimed that the
alienation of reservation land was void because it had not been
consented to by the required three-quarters of adult male inhabit-
ants and that the seizure of the reservation land without such con-
sent violated the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, presumably the
31. Id. at 554.
32. Id. at 554, 559.
33. Id. at 554.
34. Id. at 554-55.
35. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE 131, 133 (2009).
36. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 556-60. Congressional ratification was necessary due to a
federal statute enacted in 1871 prohibiting new treaties with American Indian nations. Act
of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2018)). Thus, the 1892
treaty could go into effect only by an act of Congress.
37. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 19 App. D.C. 315, 320-21 (1902).
38. POMMERSHEIM, supra note 35, at 135.
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requirement that government must compensate the owners of
private property for any takings.39 Had this land been owned by
non-Indian, American citizens, Congress certainly could not have
legislatively seized it without paying just compensation.40 In
denying Lone Wolf ’s claim, the Court analogized to the law gov-
erning international treaties: “[A]s with treaties made with foreign
nations ... the legislative power might pass laws in conflict with
treaties made with the Indians.”41 In other words, American Indian
tribes, although clearly by Supreme Court precedent not foreign
nations, would be treated as such by the government and the
Supreme Court when it suited the interests of the United States.
The decision in Lone Wolf ’s case is an example of the Supreme
Court’s reaction to social upheaval—when an oppressed, weak group
is experiencing social crisis, the Court consistently sides with
dominant forces.42 Although the American Indian tribes have won
and continue to win some legal battles in the Supreme Court,43 Lone
Wolf ’s case and others like it signify that the American Indian
tribes cannot look to the Supreme Court for protection of their basic
rights.44
II. SLAVERY AND JIM CROW
From 1641, when Massachusetts became the first British colony
to legalize slavery, until 1865, with the end of the Civil War,
millions of people were legally enslaved in the territory that cur-
rently comprises the United States of America.45 For those millions
of people, each and every day was a time of great social and political
upheaval.46 People were kidnapped from their homes, transported
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40. See Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991).
41. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566, 568.
42. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court “Failures” and a Story of Supreme
Court Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1020, 1022-23 (2016).
43. See, e.g., Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 1686, 1691 (2019).
44. See generally Singer, supra note 40; Joseph William Singer, The Indian States of
America: Parallel Universes & Overlapping Sovereignty, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2013).
45. See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America,
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1713, 1743 (1996).
46. See Patricia M. Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Forgotten Crime
Against Humanity as Defined by International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 883, 899-902
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to distant lands, deprived of all human, social, and political rights,
and legally treated as property by their so-called owners.47 All of
this was abetted by a legal system whose seminal document, the
Magna Charta Libertatum of 1216, or Great Charter of Liberties,
proclaimed that
[n]o free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his
standing in any way, nor will we proceed with force against him,
or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his
equals or by the law of the land.48
Even in 1216, the system was infected by the realization that some
people, those not included in the phrase “free man,” could be
stripped of their rights without lawful judgment.49
A. The Early Decisions
The courts of the United States, under the influence of the Great
Charter, perpetuated the slavery system, effectively aiding and
abetting the great injustices done to millions of people experiencing
social and political upheaval.50 Lest we be tempted to dismiss the
judicial acceptance of slavery as a product of the times and required
by positive law, it is important to place the early decisions in con-
text. By the early nineteenth century, the international slave trade
was steadily subjected to widespread condemnation.51 It was legis-
latively outlawed by the British Parliament in 1807,52 and in 1810
found by a British court to be contrary to the law of nations.53 In the
United States, Congress outlawed the slave trade immediately
(2004).
47. See id. at 892-93.
48. English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (G.R.C. Davis trans., 1963), https://
www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation [https://perma.cc/2QW3-
9GML].
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Roberta Alexander, Dred Scott: The Decision that Sparked a Civil War, 45
N. KY. L. REV. 643, 645 (2007).
51. See EARL M. MALTZ, SLAVERY AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1825-1861 4 (2009).
52. See id.
53. See The Amedie (1810) 12 Eng. Rep. 92, 97 (appeal taken from Vice Adm.).
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upon the expiration of the Constitution’s provision protecting it54
and strengthened the prohibition in 1819.55 In 1821, Justice Story,
sitting as Circuit Justice, concluded that the “slave trade was
contrary to the law of nations as well as domestic law.”56 Yet when
the issue reached the full Court in The Antelope,57 the Court
concluded that, while the slave trade was contrary to the law of
nature, it was not contrary to the law of nations, and thus, based on
the proof at trial, some of the people on board the ship in question
could legally be held as the slaves of Spanish claimants in Florida.58
There were, of course, important judicial decisions that refused to
carry slavery any further than required by applicable positive law.59
The most famous example is Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Somerset
v. Stewart, in which he decided that slavery existed only as a matter
of positive law and, therefore, could not be introduced into a new
territory without a legislative act supporting it.60 Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts followed this reasoning when he
held that slaves brought temporarily into Massachusetts, where
slavery was by then illegal, were freed by the act of entering the
state.61 But in the Supreme Court of the United States, the weight
of authority was decidedly on the side of the slave system, culminat-
ing in Dred Scott’s rule that even free blacks, if descended from
slaves, were not citizens of the United States and thus could not
invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts to seek their
freedom.62
54. See Act Prohibiting the Importation of Slaves of 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426.
55. See Act in Addition to the Acts Prohibiting the Slave Trade of 1819, ch. 101, 3 Stat.
532; MALTZ, supra note 51, at 4.
56. MALTZ, supra note 51, at 5 (citing United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832,
851 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551)).
57. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
58. Id. at 66, 126-27.
59. See Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510.
60. See id.
61. See Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 224 (1836); see also ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 94 (1975). Chief Justice
Shaw was also the author of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Roberts
v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 95 (5 Cush.) 198, 210 (1850), in which the court upheld the consti-
tutionality of racially segregated schools in the city of Boston.
62. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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B. Reconstruction
The period after the Civil War was one of great social and
political upheaval—possibly the most politically and socially
charged moments in the history of the United States, other than the
war itself.63 In the years immediately following the Civil War, in
many states, Reconstruction governments composed of Republicans,
freedmen, and people of African descent who had never been en-
slaved legislatively removed racial restrictions on voting and
granted equal rights to all.64 Louisiana was an especially good
example of this phenomenon.65 Louisiana’s 1867-1868 constitutional
convention included white and black members66 and produced a
constitution, adopted in March 1868, that eliminated de jure racial
discrimination, included voting rights for all, and outlawed racial
discrimination, even in privately owned modes of public trans-
portation.67 The many victories for equal rights in the formerly
Confederate states were short-lived, and the Supreme Court of the
United States actively abetted the “redemption”68 of the South by
the white supremacist establishment.69
In nearly every post-Civil War case involving race relations that
came before the Supreme Court, the white establishment prevailed.
Decision after decision limited the scope of civil rights laws and
Congress’s power to legislate in the field.70 Many of these decisions
were legal landmarks that set the framework for Jim Crow laws
that lasted until the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.71
It was not obvious immediately after the Civil War that the
Supreme Court would lead the legal march to Jim Crow. Three early
63. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II:
Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (2002).
64. See Eric Foner, The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction—and Vice Versa,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1586 (2012).
65. See LA. CONST. of 1868 art. XIII, 98.
66. See CHARLES VINCENT, BLACK LEGISLATORS IN LOUISIANA DURING RECONSTRUCTION
48 (2011).
67. Id.
68. See NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR 188 (2006).
69. See Foner, supra note 64, at 1588.
70. Id.
71. See James W. Fox Jr., Doctrinal Myths and the Management of Cognitive Dissonance:
Race, Law, and the Supreme Court’s Doctrinal Support of Jim Crow, 34 STETSON L. REV. 293,
302, 314-15 (2005).
944 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:931
Supreme Court decisions affecting race relations, including two from
Louisiana, were won by the progressive side.72 The first was the
landmark Slaughter-House Cases,73 known today mainly for con-
struing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment narrowly.74 At the time, the decision in the Slaughter-
House Cases was understood as a victory for the progressive
Republican government in Louisiana against the racist establish-
ment in the butchering business.75 The second was a little-known
case that upheld a procedural aspect, added in 1871, to an anti-
discrimination statute that Louisiana’s Republican legislature
enacted in the late 1860s under its 1868 constitution.76
The arguments rejected in the Slaughter-House Cases foreshad-
owed the principles that prevailed at the Supreme Court during the
Lochner era.77 The case was a challenge to economic regulation of
the business of slaughtering animals in the New Orleans area that
the challengers framed as an individual rights case.78 A Louisiana
statute passed by the Republican legislature in 1869, which the
Louisiana Supreme Court had upheld, made it unlawful to keep or
slaughter animals in the City of New Orleans on the east bank of
the Mississippi River.79 The law, intended to protect the health and
safety of New Orleans residents from the ill effects of butchery, also
established a new corporation to which it gave a monopoly over
slaughterhouse operations in three Louisiana parishes.80 The legis-
lature may have also been concerned with race discrimination in the
business.81
Incumbent slaughterhouse operators and butchers challenged
the law, claiming it violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
72. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875); R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445,
446 (1873); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 36-37 (1873).
73. 83 U.S. at 36.
74. See Michael A. Ross, Justice Miller’s Reconstruction: The Slaughter-House Cases,
Health Codes, and Civil Rights in New Orleans, 1861-1873, 64 J.S. HIST. 649, 649 (1998).
75. See id. at 652.
76. Walker, 92 U.S. at 90, 92.
77. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
78. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 57, 59.
79. Id. at 38, 44.
80. Id. at 39, 43.
81. See Ross, supra note 74, at 656, 664.
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Amendments.82 They claimed it created an involuntary servitude,
abridged their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United
States, denied them equal protection, and deprived them of property
without due process of law.83 The main claim was that the statute
deprived butchers in New Orleans “of the right to exercise their
trade.”84 One aim of the statute was to remove economic and social
barriers to black participation in the business of raising animals.85
At the time, it was understood that the Slaughter-House plaintiffs
were mounting a conservative challenge to state regulatory power
with the aim of preserving white economic and racial domination in
the business of slaughterhouses.86
The Court’s decision upholding the statute took an expansive
view of the regulatory powers of state and local governments and a
narrow view of the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.87 On governmental power, the Court
stated, “[I]t is both the right and the duty of the legislative body—
the supreme power of the State or municipality—to prescribe and
determine the localities where the business of slaughtering for a
great city may be conducted.”88 The Court noted that government-
granted monopolies can be contrary to the public interest and have
been condemned in England and Europe, but it found that American
representative bodies could be presumed to be acting in the public
interest and so could grant them.89 Such monopolies were not as
suspect as those granted by unelected monarchs.90
The Court also found ample justification for the law in the health
and safety problems that had been generated by the location of
slaughterhouses throughout the city.91 As Michael Ross described
the legislative record:
82. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 43.
83. Id. at 50, 56.
84. Id. at 60.
85. See Ross, supra note 74, at 656.
86. See id. at 661.
87. See id. at 649-50.
88. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 61.
89. Id. at 62.
90. Id. at 65.
91. Id. at 62.
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The abattoirs were bloody, filthy, and unregulated. Burly
butchers killed the animals with hammers or knives, then
skinned, gutted, and hung their fly-covered carcasses on hooks
to dangle unrefrigerated for hours, even days. The mass of gory
waste generated by these squalid businesses was then thrown
directly into either the streets or the Mississippi River. A New
Orleans doctor testified to a legislative committee: “Barrels filled
with entrails, liver, blood, urine, dung, and other refuse, portions
in an advanced stage of decomposition, are constantly being
thrown into the river .... poisoning the air with offensive smells
and necessarily contaminating the water near the bank for
miles.” Much of the rotting refuse from the slaughterhouses and
stock landings collected in the river around the giant suction
pipes from which New Orleans drew its water supply. “When the
river is low,” the president of the New Orleans Board of Health
testified, “it is not uncommon to see intestines and portions of
putrefied animal matter lodged immediately around the pipes.
The liquid portion of this putrefied matter is sucked into the
reservoir.” Pilings designed to stop the bulk waste matter from
entering the pipes proved inefficient, and the pumping system
repeatedly clogged.92
Finding that the law fell within the traditional powers of state
and local government, the Court turned next to whether it violated
any provision of the newly adopted amendments to the Constitution.
The amendments’ primary purpose, the Court said, was to protect
the newly freed slaves and other racial minorities—not to interfere
with existing state regulatory power over businesses such as
slaughterhouses.93 The Court refused to read the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as creating extensive federal power superseding
that of the states.94 In the Court’s view, the clause merely prohibited
discrimination against persons from other states and guaranteed a
limited range of rights implicit in federal citizenship such as the
right to bring claims against the government and to access outlets
92. See Ross, supra note 74, at 654 (omission in original) (first quoting H.R. Special
Committee on the Removal of the Slaughter Houses, 1867 Leg., Sess. 2-2 (La. 1857) (statement
of Dr. E. S. Lewis); then quoting State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545, 553 (1870); and then citing
Ronald M. Labbe, New Light on the Slaughterhouse Monopoly Act of 1869, in EDWARD F.
HAAS, LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 150 (1983)).
93. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71-72, 78.
94. Id. at 77-78.
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of foreign commerce.95 The Court also found no violation of due
process or equal protection, saying that to read those clauses to
invalidate the Louisiana slaughterhouse statutes would work a
radical redistribution of government power away from the states
and toward the federal government.96 (A few decades later, during
the so-called Lochner era, the Supreme Court would read the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to protect
background property and contract rights and invalidate all kinds of
economic regulation.)97
The Slaughter-House Cases’ narrow construction of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause has long been lamented as a defeat for the
cause of progressive change.98 Civil rights advocates believe that the
Court could have used the clause as a tool to protect blacks against
Jim Crow laws that restricted, inter alia, voting, property owner-
ship, and entry into professions.99 Given the convulsive changes
throughout American constitutional law that have occurred since
1873, the Court’s narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in that one decision cannot explain why the Court has never
read the Clause more broadly.
The Court’s second progressive decision on race was also handed
down in 1873, and it involved segregation of passengers on a
Virginia railroad that, with permission of Congress, passed through
the District of Columbia.100 In 1863, when the Alexandria and Wash-
ington Railroad Company applied for permission to alter its route
in the District of Columbia, Congress agreed on the condition that
“no person shall be excluded from the cars on account of color.”101 By
1868, the railroad’s successor, the Washington, Alexandria, and
Georgetown Railroad Company, had established a rule or practice
95. Id. at 77.
96. Id. at 77-78, 80.
97. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CON-
STITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE
2 (1993).
98. See Ross, supra note 74, at 649-52; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 502 (5th ed. 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court interpreted the
clause in an extremely narrow manner and thus precluded its use as a vehicle for applying
the Bill of Rights to the states.”).
99. See Ross, supra note 74, at 649-50.
100. R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445, 451-52 (1873).
101. Id. at 452.
948 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:931
of providing separate cars for colored passengers and barred
Catharine Brown, a woman of color, from the car reserved for “white
ladies.”102 The railroad’s defense to her suit over this treatment was
that she was offered a seat in a car reserved for colored ladies which
was equal, in all respects, to the white ladies’ car.103 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice David Davis, rejected the railroad’s
argument, pointing out that the phrase “excluded from the cars”
must be understood to require integration, since actual exclusion
was never practiced by railroads.104 Given the lack of a history of
race-based exclusion, Congress must have been aiming at segrega-
tion. This is consistent with the understanding in later cases that
legislation requiring racial equality did not allow for segregation
unless the statute explicitly said so.
The Court’s third major decision on race, 1875’s Walker v.
Sauvinet, dealt with a procedural point that arose under Louisiana’s
prohibition on race discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion.105 The case arose after Walker refused to serve Sauvinet, Civil
Sheriff of Orleans Parish, in his New Orleans saloon.106 When the
jury deadlocked, which the Louisiana legislature anticipated would
be likely in discrimination cases, the trial judge, pursuant to a pro-
vision of a recently enacted Louisiana statute, decided in favor of
Sauvinet.107 Walker claimed that this procedure deprived him of his
privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States under
the Slaughter-House Cases and that it was contrary to due pro-
cess.108 In an opinion by Chief Justice Morrison Waite, the Supreme
Court rejected both arguments.109 It found that there is no federal
right to trial by jury in state court common law actions and that
the principal requirement of due process as understood at that
time—that process be followed “according to the law of the land”—
102. Id. at 447-48.
103. Id. at 452.
104. Id. at 449, 452-53.
105. 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
106. Id. at 90; Sauvinet v. Walker, 27 La. Ann. 14, 16 (1875).
107. Walker, 92 U.S. at 91-92.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 92-93.
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was satisfied, since the Louisiana court had followed Louisiana
law.110 Justices Field and Clifford dissented without opinion.111
It is impossible to draw general conclusions about the Court’s
behavior from these few decisions, but it seems fair to speculate that
the Court exhibited a favorable attitude toward preserving and even
shepherding the social changes that were occurring during this pe-
riod of social and political upheaval. The Justices must have known
that most southern whites resented the participation of blacks in
their governments and those governments’ efforts to outlaw racial
discrimination. The futures of millions of Americans were hanging
in the balance, and law was obviously likely to play a central role in
those futures.
The Court’s attitude would soon shift strongly away from
supporting progress and toward reinstalling and reinforcing the
previous social and racial hierarchy in the newly reunited country.
Right around the same time as the decision in Sheriff Sauvinet’s
case, the Court began to lay the groundwork for a narrower view of
the reach of federal civil rights law. In United States v. Reese, the
Court invalidated a federal statute imposing criminal penalties on
state election officials who wrongfully denied citizens the right to
vote.112 Reese and a codefendant refused to allow William Garner,
“a citizen of the United States of African descent” to vote.113 The
federal statute in question, the Enforcement Act of 1870, provided
for the punishment of state officials and others who failed to allow
citizens to perform acts necessary to qualify to vote or who “by force,
bribery, threats, intimidation, or other unlawful means, hinder[ed],
delay[ed], [etc.], or ... combine[d] with others to hinder, delay, pre-
vent, or obstruct, any citizen from doing any act required to be done
to qualify him to vote, or from voting, at any election.”114 The Court,
in another opinion by Chief Justice Waite, found that the law was
too broad to be supported by the Fifteenth Amendment because it
made no reference to race as the motivation for the denial of the
110. Id. This is no longer the prevailing understanding of the Due Process Clause. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976); Frank Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 85-86.
111. Walker, 92 U.S. at 93.
112. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
113. Id. at 215.
114. Id. at 216-17; Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
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right to vote.115 The Court refused to read a requirement of racial
motivation into the statute, viewing that as a “new law” that only
Congress has the power to enact.116
Reese was a relatively minor decision because it implied that
Congress could redraft the statute to include a racial motivation and
thus criminalize racially motivated interference with the right to
vote. More significant decisions were, however, on the horizon. The
Cruikshank decision, rendered the following year, was a major
victory for the white supremacist redemption movement.117 Cruik-
shank involved the federal prosecution of more than 100 of the
white participants in the 1873 Colfax riot in which as many as 150
blacks were killed by whites attempting to forcibly take control of
the Grant Parish courthouse.118 Cruikshank was an early test of the
boundary between state and federal criminal jurisdiction involving
civil rights. The prosecutions were brought under a provision of the
Enforcement Act of 1870 that created a federal crime when “two or
more persons ... injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen,
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of
any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the constitution
or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the
same[.]”119 The federal rights that the indictment alleged included
the right of blacks to peaceably assemble, the right not to be de-
prived of life or liberty without due process of law, and the right to
bear arms.120 In an opinion by Chief Justice Waite, the Court found
that the indictments failed to properly allege violations of any right
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.121
The Waite Court’s analysis in Cruikshank provided a blueprint
for future judicial resistance to pleas from blacks for protection from
both legal and extralegal oppression. The opinion includes a mix-
ture of broad, principled statements on the reach of federal law and
a technical discussion of defects in the indictments.122 The Court
115. Reese, 92 U.S. at 220-22.
116. Id. at 221.
117. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
118. Id. at 560 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 548 (majority opinion) (quoting Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 141).
120. Id. at 551-53.
121. Id. at 559.
122. See id. at 550-53.
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first generally outlined principles of federalism under which the
states remained the primary protectors of individual rights, even
after the adoption of the post-Civil War constitutional amendments
explicitly limiting state power.123 The Court found that the right to
assemble—which the government alleged the defendants had
violated—was a First Amendment right that applied only against
the federal government, not against the states.124 The Court noted
that the indictment might have been upheld if it had alleged that
the defendants had intended to prevent assembly for “consultation
in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of griev-
ances.”125 This highly technical analysis is often encountered in
criminal law, where, under the “rule of lenity,” all legal and factual
doubts are traditionally resolved in favor of the defendant.126
The Court found each of the remaining counts in the indictment
defective. With respect to the victims’ right to bear arms, the Court
said—in a holding that would remain good law until 2010—that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms is addressed only to the
federal government and cannot be violated by state or local author-
ities.127 The Court found that the counts involving life and liberty
were defective because, although the victims were identified as “of
African descent,” the indictment did not specifically allege “that this
was done because of the race or color of the persons conspired
against.”128 This must have been frustrating to the victims and
federal prosecutors in Cruickshank, because everyone in the country
knew that what happened in Colfax was a race-based conflict.
The Court’s expressed concern was that letting this indictment
allege a federal crime would shift the balance of power between the
states and the federal government too far toward the federal
government.129 Counts in the indictment alleged, for example, that
the defendants deprived their victims of life and liberty without due
123. Id. at 550-51.
124. Id. at 552.
125. Id. at 552-53.
126. Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 698 (2017).
127. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010)
(holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Second
Amendment right to bear arms to both the federal and state governments equally).
128. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554.
129. See id. at 553-54.
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process.130 The Court observed that this would bring all cases of
murder or false imprisonment within federal criminal jurisdiction.131
To preserve the traditional federalist structure of the United States,
the Court said federal jurisdiction must be limited.132
The Court also relied on the developing doctrine of state action to
rule against the prosecution. According to the Court, “the case as
presented amount[ed] to nothing more than that the defendants
conspired to prevent certain citizens of the United States, being
within the State of Louisiana, from enjoying the equal protection of
the laws of the State and of the United States,” and equal protection
applied only to governmental action, not to the behavior of one
citizen toward another.133
The Court shut its eyes to the social and political context of the
case, ignoring the race issue and the importance of federal protec-
tion for blacks against the resurgence of white supremacist power
across the South.134 The Colfax massacre, as it was often called, had
been covered widely in newspapers and had prompted hearings in
Congress.135 The opinion, by contrast, is largely a technical discus-
sion of the requirements of federal criminal jurisdiction under the
Enforcement Act.136 Its rhetorical flourishes were confined to the
importance of maintaining state control over its criminal law.137
Chief Justice Waite expressed no concern over the social problem of
racial discrimination.138 The decision was unanimous, save for a
Justice Clifford opinion, styled as a dissent, which actually agreed
with the Court’s result, though for different reasons.139 He thought
the indictments were too “vague and indefinite” and thus did not
meet the traditional requirements for certainty and fair notice in
130. See id. at 545.
131. See id. at 553-54.
132. See id. at 549-51.
133. Id. at 554.
134. See id.
135. LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE 66-67, 114-15 (2008).
136. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 560-65 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 556-57 (majority opinion).
138. See id.
139. See id. at 559 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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criminal prosecutions.140 That had also been Justice Bradley’s view,
when he heard the case while riding circuit in Louisiana.141
The next major race-based civil rights case to reach the Supreme
Court was the 1878 decision in Hall v. Decuir.142 This case involved
the application of Louisiana’s prohibition of racial discrimination in
transportation to a riverboat operating on the Mississippi River.143
The Court held that Louisiana could not enforce its law on the river
because enforcement would interfere with interstate commerce by
regulating conduct on a navigable waterway and imposing poten-
tially conflicting regulations as riverboats moved from one state to
another.144 As Chief Justice Waite explained it, “A passenger in the
cabin set apart for the use of whites without the State must, when
the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with
such colored persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is
enforced” and
[o]n one side of the river or its tributaries he might be required
to observe one set of rules, and on the other another. Commerce
cannot flourish in the midst of such embarrassments.... Unifor-
mity in the regulations by which he is to be governed from one
end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business.145
While the Cruikshank Court was concerned with federal over-
reaching, Chief Justice Waite’s opinion in Hall v. Decuir expressed
the opposite concern, that Louisiana intruded on federal authority
over interstate commerce by trying to apply its civil rights law on
the Mississippi River.146 In another of Waite’s bloodless, apparently
technical opinions, he appeared to be much more concerned with
maintaining the proper boundary between federal and state author-
ity than with protecting people of color from the continuing and
burgeoning effects of racial discrimination throughout the country.
140. See id. at 565.
141. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 715 (D. La. 1874), aff’d 92 U.S. 542
(1875).
142. 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
143. See id. at 485-87.
144. See id. at 488-91.
145. Id. at 489.
146. See id. at 497-98.
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The decision in Hall v. Decuir was reached by the Supreme Court
Justices in October 1877 and announced in January 1878.147 The
year 1877 was very significant for the history of race relations in the
United States. In a compromise that led to the victory of Rutherford
B. Hayes in the disputed 1876 presidential election, the new Re-
publican administration agreed to remove federal troops from
southern states, essentially abandoning African Americans to their
fate at the hands of resurgent white supremacist governments.148
The political winds may have been too strong for the Court to resist,
but, in retrospect, it is clear that the decisions in Cruickshank and
Hall signaled the Court’s determination to aid in the suppression of
the movement for racial justice and reinforce preexisting social and
racial hierarchies.
The Court’s efforts to suppress social change neared their pin-
nacle in a pair of much more significant civil rights cases decided by
the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Waite in 1883. In that year,
the Court struck down two federal civil rights statutes: a portion of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the entire Civil Rights Act of 1875.
The first case, United States v. Harris, involved a criminal provision
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 clearly aimed at the Ku Klux Klan.149
The statute provided:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go
in disguise upon the highway or on the premises of another for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State
or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such
State or Territory the equal protection of the laws, each of said
persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500 nor
more than $5,000, or by imprisonment, with or without hard
labor, not less than six months nor more than six years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment.150
147. Id. at 485.
148. Compromise of 1877, HIST. (June 7, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/us-presi
dents/compromise-of-1877 [https://perma.cc/9EQN-FXXM].
149. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
150. Id. at 632 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat.
13-14 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2018))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2020] CRISIS? WHOSE CRISIS? 955
The case arose out of a lynching.151 An armed mob—including,
incredibly, the County Sheriff, R.G. Harris—raided the Crockett
County, Tennessee jail to seize four black prisoners.152 Despite the
efforts of a deputy, William A. Tucker, to stop them, the mob re-
moved the four black prisoners from the jail and beat all four,
killing one.153 The perpetrators, including Sheriff Harris, were
prosecuted by federal authorities.154 The indictments charged that
the beatings and killing arose from a conspiracy among the de-
fendants to deprive the victims of their rights, privileges, and
immunities under federal law, and that the conspiracy aimed to
prevent the local authorities, including Deputy Sheriff Tucker, from
protecting the victims’ federal rights.155
It is obvious from the language of the statute (“conspire or go in
disguise”) that Congress was referring to groups such as the Ku
Klux Klan, then terrorizing blacks and advocates of equal rights all
over the South.156 The criminal provision of this statute had been
incredibly successful.157 In 1871 alone, federal prosecutors brought
thousands of prosecutions against the Klan and similar gangs, and,
with 1143 convictions, succeeded in temporarily restoring peace and
security to large areas of the South.158
The issue before the Supreme Court, which the lower court
divided on, was whether Congress had the power to enact this pro-
vision.159 The government argued for four sources of constitutional
power: the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and
the original Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution.160
After dismissing the Fifteenth Amendment as concerned solely with
the right to vote, the Court turned its attention to Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, finding that it could not support the
151. See id. at 631-32.
152. Id. at 629-31.
153. Id. at 629-32.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 631-32.
156. See id. at 632 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat.
13-14 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. See RON CHERNOW, GRANT 708 (2017).
158. See id.
159. See Harris, 106 U.S. at 636-38.
160. See id. at 636-37.
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statute because, by its terms, it was aimed only at official govern-
mental action, not private conduct.161 It found it
perfectly clear, from the language of the first section that its
purpose ... was to place a restraint upon the action of the
states.... [T]he section of the law under consideration is directed
exclusively against the action of private persons, without
reference to the laws of the State or their administration by [the
officers of the state], we are clear in the opinion that it is not
warranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.162
That Harris, as County Sheriff, had been acting under color of state
law was not considered.
The Court found that the Thirteenth Amendment did not autho-
rize Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1871 because the Act
went beyond prohibiting conduct related to slavery to matters that
were the exclusive preserve of the states.163 Citing his opinion in the
Reese case, Chief Justice Waite drew a line between what was the
state’s business and what was the federal government’s and refused
to read the newly enacted amendments as giving Congress the
power to stamp out race discrimination for itself, which needed to
remain a state preserve.164 The Court also held that Article Four,
Section Two’s Privileges and Immunities Clause did not give the
federal government the power to interfere with matters of private
behavior governed by state law.165 “[T]his section, like the Four-
teenth Amendment, is directed against State action,” not personal
behavior, said the Court.166 Prosecuting racial violence was left to
the states.167
Eight months after the Harris decision, the Waite Court decided
the Civil Rights Cases, striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875.168
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was a federal public accommodations
161. See id. at 637-38.
162. Id. at 638, 640.
163. See id. at 640-41.
164. See id. at 641-42 (citing United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)).
165. See id. at 643-44.
166. Id. at 643.
167. Id.
168. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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law prohibiting racial discrimination in specified businesses that
served the general public.169 It declared that
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances
on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amuse-
ment; subject only to the conditions and limitations established
by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color,
regardless of any previous condition of servitude.170
Did “full and equal” include prohibiting segregation? If so, this
provision would have changed the result in cases such as Hall v.
Decuir.
The original proposal that led to the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was
drafted in 1870 by Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and
John Mercer Langston, a successful lawyer, public servant, and dip-
lomat and one of the founders of Howard University Law School.171
Sumner introduced their civil rights bill each year until his death
in 1874.172 Sumner was the leading champion in the Senate for civil
rights for African Americans and was famously caned in the Senate
chamber by South Carolina Representative Preston Brooks after
delivering a fiery antislavery speech that insulted South Carolina
Senator Andrew Butler, Brooks’s cousin.173 Reportedly, among
Sumner’s last words before he died in 1874 were, “[T]ake care of the
civil-rights bill.”174 When it was passed and signed into law by
President Grant in 1875, it was clear to all that blacks were in
danger of being relegated to a position of social and political in-
feriority similar to where they were under slavery, and their
resistance was becoming increasingly futile.175
169. See Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
170. See id.
171. Langston, John Mercer, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/16682 [https://perma.cc/Y5QL-M6M7].
172. See FREDERICK J. BLUE, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NORTH 202-05
(1994).
173. See STEPHEN PULEO, THE CANING: THE ASSAULT THAT DROVE AMERICA TO CIVIL WAR
ix-x (2012).
174. DAVID H. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 586-87 (1996).
175. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Civil Rights Act of 1875, BRITANNICA, https://www.britan
nica.com/topic/Civil-Rights-Act-United-States-1875 [https://perma.cc/2QXY-MFEG].
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The Civil Rights Cases consisted of five consolidated cases from
Kansas, Missouri, California, New York, and Tennessee prosecuting
operators of various businesses for violating the 1875 Act.176 They
dealt with the broad swath of the Act’s coverage including denials
of accommodations to blacks in a hotel, a theater, an opera house,
and a railroad.177 The central purpose of the Act, said the Court, was
“to declare that, in the enjoyment of the accommodations and
privileges of inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of
public amusement, no distinction shall be made between citizens of
different race or color, or between those who have, and those who
have not, been slaves.”178 The only issue the Court addressed was
whether Congress had the power to enact it.179
Justice Joseph P. Bradley wrote the opinion for the Court, fo-
cusing on the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.180 As for the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brad-
ley’s analysis expanded on Harris.181 As in Harris, which struck
down a provision of the 1871 Act, the federal government could not
regulate private discrimination because the Fourteenth Amendment
reached only state action.182
[U]ntil some State law has been passed, or some State action
through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the
rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be
called into activity: for the prohibitions of the amendment are
against State laws and acts done under State authority.183
The Court’s analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment was more
complex, for, in abolishing the private relationship of master and
slave, that amendment clearly regulates purely private conduct. The
Court assumed, as the government argued, that “the power vested
176. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1883).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 9-10.
179. See id. at 8-26.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 18-19.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Id. at 13.
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in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation, clothes
Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abol-
ishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States[.]”184
The Court then explained why, in its view, private exclusion from
public accommodations was not a badge or incident of slavery.185
The Court began by detailing the legal features of slavery:
Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master,
restraint of his movements except by the master's will, disability
to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court,
to be a witness against a white person, and such like burdens
and incapacities, were the inseparable incidents of the institu-
tion. Severer punishments for crimes were imposed on the slave
than on free persons guilty of the same offenses.186
While the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to
legislate against these features of slavery, as it had done in the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, the Court asked if refusing to provide
service to a person of a certain race was a badge or incident of slav-
ery federally enforceable under the Thirteenth Amendment (in the
types of businesses addressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1875).187
Here, the Court’s analysis was conclusory, stating only:
After giving to these questions all the consideration which their
importance demands, we are forced to the conclusion that such
an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary
servitude.... It would be running the slavery argument into the
ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a
person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or
as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit
to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of
intercourse or business.188
The Court did not conclude that the law was powerless to prohibit
racial segregation or exclusion. Although in Hall v. Decuir the Court
184. Id. at 20.
185. See id. at 20-25.
186. Id. at 22.
187. Id. at 23-24.
188. Id. at 24-25.
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placed authority over race discrimination on navigable waters in the
federal government, this time the Court opined that state law could
require the operators of public accommodations to admit all regard-
less of race:
Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so
far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities,
to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons
who in good faith apply for them.189 If the laws themselves make
any unjust discrimination, amenable to the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has full power to afford a
remedy under that amendment and in accordance with it.190
The Court appears not to have considered whether the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 could be constitutionally applied to cases such as
Madame Decuir’s that arose on modes of interstate transportation.
The Court must have known that its decision in the Civil Rights
Cases was a major defeat for the cause of racial justice in the United
States. In particular, it appears that Justice Bradley chose to sup-
port the forces of white supremacy, perhaps in capitulation to the
violent resistance that the cause of equality was encountering
throughout the South.191 In 1871, Justice Bradley, in a case con-
cerning federal jurisdiction over claims alleging that blacks had
been denied the right to testify, had written the following:
Slavery, when it existed, extended its influence in every direc-
tion, depressing and disfranchising the slave and his race in
every possible way. Hence, in order to give full effect to the
National will in abolishing slavery, it was necessary in some way
to counteract these various disabilities and the effects flowing
from them. Merely striking off the fetters of the slave, without
189. Id. at 25. This understanding of state law may have been true at one time, but it was
soon replaced with an understanding that businesses that had traditionally been required to
accept all paying customers were now free to discriminate based on race. See Joseph William
Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations Law and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 1283, 1287-1301 (1996).
190. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. The Court’s apparent assumption that Congress
had power under the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit racial discrimination in public
accommodations seems inconsistent with the Court’s rejection of power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See id.
191. See CHERNOW, supra note 157, at 568, 571-72.
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removing the incidents and consequences of slavery, would
hardly have been a boon to the colored race. Hence, also, the
amendment abolishing slavery was supplemented by a clause
giving Congress power to enforce it by appropriate legislation.
No law was necessary to abolish slavery; the amendment did
that. The power to enforce the amendment by appropriate
legislation must be a power to do away with the incidents and
consequences of slavery, and to instate the freedmen in the full
enjoyment of that civil liberty and equality which the abolition
of slavery meant.192
African Americans rightly regarded the Supreme Court’s inval-
idation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as catastrophic. The title of
an 1893 account of the case provides the flavor of this reaction: “The
Barbarous Decision of the United States Supreme Court Declaring
the Civil Rights Act Unconstitutional and Disrobing the Colored
Race of All Civil Protection. The Most Cruel and Inhuman Verdict
Against a Loyal People in the History of the World.”193 The combina-
tion of Hall v. Decuir and the Civil Rights Cases must have outraged
southern blacks; the Court told them in Hall v. Decuir that only
Congress could address discrimination on riverboats, then, in the
Civil Rights Cases, that Congress lacked all power to do so.194 The
situation looked like a Catch-22. Paired with Hall, the message
seemed simply to be that the Supreme Court was hostile to any
antidiscrimination legislation—whether state or federal.
Justice John Marshall Harlan, the former slaveowner turned ju-
dicial champion of civil rights for blacks,195 wrote a long, impassion-
ed dissent from the decision in the Civil Rights Cases, criticizing the
Court for being overly technical and ignoring the “soul” of the law,
which he thought should control the interpretation of constitutional
amendments.196 Harlan viewed the Commerce Clause as a source of
192. Blylew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 601 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
193. BISHOP H.M. TURNER, THE BARBAROUS DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT DECLARING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DISROBING THE COLORED
RACE OF ALL CIVIL PROTECTION. THE MOST CRUEL AND INHUMAN VERDICT AGAINST A LOYAL
PEOPLE IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD. ALSO THE POWERFUL SPEECHES OF HON. FREDERICK
DOUGLASS AND COLONEL ROBERT G. INGERSOLL, JURIST AND FAMOUS ORATOR. (1893) (ebook).
194. J. Clay Smith, Jr., Justice and Jurisprudence and the Black Lawyer, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1077, 1099 (1994).
195. See Goodwin Liu, The First Justice Harlan, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1383, 1383-87 (2008).
196. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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authority for the Act, at least for interstate travelers.197 Hall v.
Decuir had held that only Congress had the power to regulate the
practices of steamboats in interstate commerce.198 To Harlan, Hall
v. Decuir provided strong support for federal power to require equal
treatment in interstate travel, which would save at least some
applications of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.199
The next race case to reach the Supreme Court was very similar
to Hall v. Decuir except that it arose on a railroad. Emboldened by
United States v. Harris and the Civil Rights Cases, the southern
states continued to enact Jim Crow laws.200 A challenge to the con-
stitutionality of one such law reached the Supreme Court in 1890.201
An 1888 Mississippi statute required that “all railroads carrying
passengers in this State (other than street railroads) shall provide
equal, but separate, accommodation for the white and colored races,
by providing two or more passenger cars for each passenger train,
or by dividing the passenger cars by a partition, so as to secure
separate accommodations.”202 Railroads usually opposed such rules
because the rules increased their cost of operations.203
In August 1888, the Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway
Company was indicted for not providing separate accommodations
as required by law.204 The railroad said it was an interstate oper-
ation, carrying passengers from Tennessee to New Orleans, “and
other points in the state of Louisiana ... and elsewhere throughout
the United States,” and that the railroad had always “provided
equal but not separate accommodations for passengers of the white
and colored races[.]”205 The railroad also said that it operated only
interstate trains through Mississippi and, therefore, under Hall v.
Decuir, the statute was unconstitutional as applied to their
railroad.206
197. See id. at 61.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Singer, supra note 189, at 1354-57; see also C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW 67-72 (Commemorative ed. 2002).
201. Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
202. Id. at 588 (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1888, ch. 27, § 1, 1888 Miss. Laws 48).
203. See id. at 591.
204. Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co. v. State, 6 So. 203, 203 (Miss. 1889).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 203-04.
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After losing in the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the railroad
brought the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, re-
newing its argument that the statute interfered unconstitutionally
with interstate commerce.207 Justice David Brewer’s opinion for the
Supreme Court rejecting the railroad’s claim was brief.208 He stated,
inaccurately, that in Hall v. Decuir, Louisiana’s Supreme Court had
determined that the statute challenged there sought to regulate
interstate travelers coming into the State of Louisiana and then
characterized Mississippi’s law as applying “solely to commerce
within the State.”209 Mississippi, the Court concluded, had power to
regulate the purely intrastate activities of its railroads.210
The next, and most important, shoe to drop in the Supreme
Court’s post-Civil War racial odyssey was Plessy v. Ferguson.211 This
landmark case, familiar to all who study the history of race and the
law in the United States, presented the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to act on the vision of the Fourteenth Amendment it
had formulated in the Civil Rights Cases: the nullification of “all
State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which
injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.”212
In Plessy, a Louisiana statute requiring racial segregation on rail-
road cars, either through separate cars or via a divider, was chal-
lenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.213 The Louisiana Railway Accommodations Act of
1890, also known as the Separate Car Law, required
that all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches
in this State, shall provide equal but separate accommodations
for the white, and colored races, by providing two or more pas-
senger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the
passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accom-
modations.... No person or persons, shall be permitted to occupy
207. Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co., 133 U.S. at 589.
208. Id. at 588-92.
209. Id. at 591.
210. Id. at 592.
211. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
212. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
213. 163 U.S. at 541-43.
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seats in coaches, other than, the ones, assigned, to them on ac-
count of the race they belong to.214
The statute also imposed fines and imprisonment for passengers
insisting on riding in the incorrect car, provided fines for railroad
employees who refused to enforce the law, and required railroads to
post a copy of the law in each passenger coach and ticket office.215
But the key substantive provision of the statute was that railroads
must “provide equal but separate accommodations for the white,
and colored races.”216
Plessy v. Ferguson was a test case with roots in “black opposition
to the Louisiana Separate Car Act” from the day it was introduced
into the Louisiana General Assembly.217 This was a period of intense
social crisis for African Americans in the South, and, in Louisiana,
a newly formed group, the American Citizens’ Equal Rights Asso-
ciation, wrote a “memorial” in opposition to the bill invoking basic
American principles such as “all men are created equal.”218 Never-
theless, the bill passed, and they, together with other opponents of
the Act, organized quickly to plan a case to challenge it as unconsti-
tutional.219 It was expected that the railroads would cooperate, since
they were opposed to the Act on economic grounds.220
The test case was planned by a committee that included two of
the signers of the memorial, Louis A. Martinet and Rodolphe
Desdunes, well-known New Orleans men of color.221 The Committee
adopted the name “Citizens’ Committee” to stress that their claim
to equal treatment arose from their status as citizens of Louisiana
and the United States.222 In his paean to his fellow French-speaking
people of color, Desdunes characterized the Committee’s purpose as
214. Id. at 540 (quoting Act of July 10, 1890, No. 111, § 1, 1890 La. Acts 152, 153) (internal
quotations omitted).
215. Id. at 540-41.
216. Id. at 540.
217. See CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
28 (1987).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 29-30.
220. See Gail Heriot, Don’t Blame the Railroad for Plessy v. Ferguson, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(May 18, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://www.reason.com/2018/05/18/don’t-blame-the-railroad-for-
plessy-v-fer/ [https://perma.cc/F4NP-SU8Y].
221. See LOFGREN, supra note 217, at 29.
222. See id.
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“to protest the adoption and enforcement of the statutes that
established the unjust and humiliating treatment of the black race
in Louisiana.”223 They recruited well-known New Yorker (and
Reconstruction-era official in North Carolina) Albion Tourgee to
their cause as lead attorney.224 They decided that their best hope
was for someone to get arrested for violating the Act, after which
they would use the habeas corpus procedure to secure the quickest
possible process for bringing the challenge to court.225
After their first test case failed, Homer Plessy was arrested for
violating the Act after he insisted on traveling in a car reserved for
whites.226 Plessy’s train operated wholly intrastate, and the Assis-
tant District Attorney carefully avoided any technical problems that
would prevent a conviction.227 After Plessy’s motion to dismiss the
case was denied by Judge John Howard Ferguson, his lawyers
maneuvered to have the case heard by the Louisiana Supreme
Court as quickly as possible by bringing a petition in that court
against Judge Ferguson seeking Plessy’s acquittal.228 The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court issued its decision against Plessy on December
19, 1892, and his lawyers brought the case to the Supreme Court of
the United States.229
Plessy’s lawyers claimed that the Act violated the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments.230 The Supreme Court’s decision of
May 18, 1896, denying Plessy’s appeal was the final blow in the
effort to resist restoration of white supremacy in the South. The
Court’s opinion was written by Justice Henry Billings Brown, a
Massachusetts Republican.231 Given the Civil Rights Cases’ narrow
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, Justice Brown had lit-
tle difficulty dispatching Plessy’s Thirteenth Amendment argument.
223. Rodolphe L. Desdunes, Non Hommes et Notre Histoire (1911), translated in OUR
PEOPLE AND OUR HISTORY 142-43 (Sister Dorothea Olga McCants trans., 1973).
224. LOFGREN, supra note 217, at 30.
225. Id. at 31-32, 41.
226. Id. at 41.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 42.
229. See Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. 948 (La. 1893).
230. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896).
231. See id. at 540; Sean A. Scott, Segregation Setback: The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson,
LAW & LIBERTY (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.lawliberty.org/book-review/segregation-setback-
the-story-of-plessy-v-ferguson/ [https://perma.cc/CB2T-XRPX].
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Echoing (and relying upon) the opinion in the Civil Rights Cases,
Justice Brown stated,
[I]t does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which
abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery implies
involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the ownership of
mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the labor and
services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence
of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and
services.... Indeed, we do not understand that the Thirteenth
Amendment is strenuously relied upon by the plaintiff in error
in this connection.232
Justice Brown’s analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment question
refuted every legal and practical argument Plessy’s lawyers made
against legally required segregation. It must have been heartbreak-
ing to people of color of the day. The Court began by distinguishing
between legal equality and social equality,233 and placing the rights
African Americans were asserting in resistance to segregation into
the category of social rights:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the
nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distin-
guished from political equality, or a commingling of the two
races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.234
Justice Brown then rejected the argument that segregation was
equivalent to putting a badge of inferiority on nonwhites, blaming
that perception on the victims of segregation:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff 's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this
232. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-43.
233. See Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of the
Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 778, 783 (2009).
234. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
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be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it.235
Justice Brown’s opinion treated segregation as a normal, accepted,
valid exercise of state police power, citing Charles Sumner’s un-
successful challenge to the segregation of Boston’s public schools
and Congress’s establishment of segregated public schools in the
District of Columbia.236 To Justice Brown, laws requiring segrega-
tion and forbidding interracial marriage did not infringe upon the
right to equality as long as they applied equally to all.237
Justice Harlan was the lone dissenter in Plessy. His dissent ar-
gued quite simply for a constitutional mandate of color-blind
government:
[T]he Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit
any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be
protected in the enjoyment of such rights.... I deny that any
legislative body or judicial tribunal may have regard to the race
of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are involved.238
Justice Harlan invoked social reality to dispute the argument that
segregation does not imply the perceived inferiority of nonwhites:
“Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the
purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occu-
pied by or assigned to white persons.”239 In those times, a constitu-
tional rule of color-blind treatment would have been a giant step
toward equality.
Before the Plessy decision, the South had been “redeemed” po-
litically when conservative whites retook southern governments
through violence, intimidation, and manipulation of the political
and electoral processes.240 Legally, Plessy was the capstone on the
Waite Court’s dismantling of efforts to protect the right of people of
235. Id. at 551.
236. Id. at 544.
237. See id. at 551.
238. Id. at 554-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 557.
240. NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR 185 (2006).
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color to a full and equal place in the public sphere. Fledgling
Republican Party institutions in the South and the mixed-race
governments that arose after the Civil War were demolished as the
former rebels regained control over governments throughout the
South. Efforts to retain the right to vote, which some people of color
had enjoyed for decades in Louisiana and other southern states,
were dashed when the Supreme Court, in 1903, held that the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction to intervene on behalf of blacks
seeking injunctive relief to force the State of Alabama to register
them to vote.241 In a challenge to similar Louisiana restrictions on
voting, the plaintiffs abandoned their case after losing in state
court, recognizing that appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States was hopeless.242 As George Carlin said in reference to the
detention of Japanese Americans during World War II, “Just when
these American citizens needed their rights the most, their govern-
ment took ‘em away.”243
It may be that invalidating segregation in the nineteenth century
would have been deeply unpopular and even unenforceable.244 But
the Court’s decisions rendered Congress virtually impotent in the
face of widespread and violent oppression of nonwhite populations
throughout the South. The Court’s decision to overrule Plessy in
1954245 was met with a storm of resistance and may not have suc-
ceeded in integrating education in the United States,246 but it
dramatically advanced the cause of equal rights for African Amer-
icans far beyond the public school context.
CONCLUSION
Virtually every moment in the history of civilized human society
has been experienced by some people as “politically and socially
241. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); see also Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904).
242. See REBECCA SCOTT, DEGREES OF FREEDOM 197 (2008) (discussing the litigation in
State ex rel. Ryanes v. Gleason, 112 La. 612 (1904)).
243. George Carlin, You Have No Rights, YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2008), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=hWiBt-pqp0E&t=9s [https://perma.cc/TX5K-348L].
244. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 10 (2004).
245. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
246. See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2004).
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charged.” For Native Americans and African slaves in the United
States and its preindependence colonies, every moment of every
day was a crisis of the highest political and social order, although
society’s dominant forces did not recognize them as such. In these
circumstances, although they often pretend to be governed by
preexisting legal rules, courts have no choice but to take sides, as
they have done more recently on issues arising out of the war on
terror, abortion rights, and gun control, to name but a few politically
and socially charged issues. With exceptions that certainly test my
observation,247 it seems to me that the Supreme Court of the United
States acts most strongly in politically and socially charged times to
reinforce preexisting social and political hierarchies to the det-
riment of those who need the protection of the legal system the
most.
247. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that Congress may not
suspend the right to habeas corpus for noncitizen prisoners held at the detention center at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing women’s right to
choose abortion).
